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In order to improve the market value of the product, the platform enterprise often participates in the development process of
supporting product of emerging industry’s platform innovation ecosystem. This paper puts forward a revenue sharing contract
between the platform company and the supporting company by creating a collaborative development model of the supporting
product in the ecosystem, and this paper studies the platform enterprise investment resource property’s (complementary or
substitution) impact on the supporting enterprise R&D efforts and the revenue sharing factor and analyzes collaborative
development mechanism of supporting product of emerging industry platform innovation ecosystem. The research indicates that
when platform enterprise and supporting enterprise’s resources are complementary, the supporting enterprise R&D effort level and
revenue sharing coefficient increase as the platform company’s investment increases. When platform enterprise and supporting
enterprise’s resources are substitutive, the supporting enterprise’s R&D effort level and revenue sharing coefficient decrease as the
platform company’s investment increases.
1. Introduction
In today’s increasingly competitive market, technological
innovation based on innovative platform is increasingly
important for emerging industries (such as personal comput-
ers, computer operating systems, and the Internet industry).
In order to meet the diverse needs of users and have access to
external network economic effects, the platform owners usu-
ally use the strategy opening platform technology interface
and encourage external innovation organizations (such as
enterprises, universities, and research institutes) to conduct
innovation of complementary components based on product
platform [1]. Technologies innovative platform and a range of
complementary external components together provide users
with a complete set of product or service solution [2]. For
example, in order to improve the product innovation speed
and only focus on the research and development of platform
technology (microprocessor), the Internet companies seek
the outside innovation organizations to develop the software
through freely opening the interface of platform technology
and close integration between hardware, middleware, and
application software that forms the overall solution and
constitutes a platform for innovation ecosystems.
Hence, the platform innovation ecosystem is an inter-
dependent partnership established by the core innovation
enterprises which opens innovation platform interface, and
other participants who have the product technology supplied
the disadvantages of core enterprise, such as companies,
universities, research institutes, upstream suppliers, and
downstream distributors, users, and even competitors [3–5].
Each innovation organization forms group relations which
is similar with ecosystems within the platform innovation;
they coexist, mutually parasitic, and work together to create
value for consumers. In platform innovation ecosystems, the
market value is decided not only by core platform products
but also by relevant supporting complementary components.
For example, in the aircraft platform innovation ecosystem
in which Airbus is the core enterprise, the influence for the
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product value is from not only the fuselage structure done
by Airbus but also the aircraft engines and other supporting
complementary components. So the technology innovation
of ancillary products is so important, and platformcompanies
are often also involved in the development of complementary
products and cooperate with the supporting enterprises.
In addition to focusing on the development of platform
architecture, Airbus also is involved in the development of
aircraft engines, thus increasing the value of system products.
There are already a lot of researches on platform inno-
vation ecosystem. Baldwin and Clark [6] and Schilling [7]
studied the methods about engineering design, platform
architecture, and modular innovation in platform ecosystem.
Suarez and Battles [8] and Murmann and Frenken [9]
analyzed evolution of platform technology and the technical
advantages of platform innovation. Perrons [10] studied the
platform enterprises’ process on trust and control mech-
anisms that maintained the leading position in platform
innovation ecosystem. Adner and Kapoor [11] conducted the
empirical research on the technology during 1962 and 2005
years in the global semiconductor CD equipment industry
and found that the external challenges of core enterprise
innovation performance in innovation ecosystem depends
on not only the enterprises scale in ecosystem but also
their relative ecology position. Nambisan and Baron [12]
studied the main functions of the core enterprise in platform
innovation ecosystem, the selection criteria of cooperation
members as well as cooperation rules. Ceccagnoli et al.
[13] studied the motivation of outside supporting companies
that added into platform innovation ecosystem, including
quickly accessing to the established markets, acquiring the
corresponding brand and reputation advantage, and getting
the chances to learn technical knowledge and achieve IPO in
the capital market. S. Scholten and U. Scholten [14] studied
the control mechanisms of platform innovation ecosystem.
From the existing literature, the study of multiplatform
innovation ecosystem focused on architecture, leadership
mechanism, the mechanisms forming the advantages, and
operation mechanism. There are fewer studies on collabo-
rative development of complementary products in platform
innovation ecosystem, especially for the supporting product
development of platform companies. We also cannot find
the suitable theories to support the influencing relationship
between the nature (complementary or alternative) of the
platform enterprise resources and development efforts and
revenue sharing coefficient of supporting enterprise. Hence,
our study has some practical and theoretical value.
The research object in this paper is the collaborative
development of supporting product in platform innovation
ecosystem under asymmetric information. In this study, the
platform enterprises look forward to reducing the costs of
supporting enterprise and improving investment enthusiasm
for supporting product development by the behaviors of
ancillary products development. As the efforts of supporting
product development are unobservable by supporting enter-
prises, they often use this information advantage to bring
moral hazard. Previous studies generally use the revenue
sharing contract in principal-agent theory to solve suchmoral
hazard problem, but there is rarely literature involved in
principal participation in agent’s production and develop-
ment activities. In this paper, we established the principal-
agent model under platform enterprises participating in
innovation, proposed revenue-sharing contract between the
supporting enterprises and platform enterprises, studied
the influence of nature (complementary or alternative) of
platform enterprises’ resource inputs on research and devel-
opment effort and revenue sharing coefficient of supporting
business, and finally analyzed collaborative development
mechanisms of supporting products in emerging industry
platform innovation ecosystem.
2. Model Assumptions of Supporting Product
Collaborative Development
We assumed that a platform innovation ecosystem consists
of a platform enterprise which is involved in developing
platform product technology and a supporting enterprise
which is involved in developing supporting product [15–17].
These two types of enterprises combine the platform product
and supporting product and then provide the consumers
with a complete set of product solutions.The collaboration of
platform enterprise and supporting enterprise can be shown
from the following processes.
(1) Contract Signing. Platform enterprise first proposes
cooperation contract to supporting enterprise; the principal
terms should be included in revenue sharing mechanisms
and the participation commitments of platform enterprise.
Supporting enterprise computes its expected revenue under
the contract; if the expected benefits outweigh the retained
earnings, it chooses the cooperation or refuses to accept the
contract.
(2) Supporting Product Production. When the platform
enterprise achieves its commitment to the investment on
supporting product, the supporting enterprise begins to
choose its effort on developing supporting product and
implement the cooperation agreement.
(3) Income Payments. After the platform enterprise and sup-
porting enterprise collaboratively finish the development of
complementary products, the platform enterprise should pay
the supporting enterprise.
In order to facilitate conducting our research, we make
the following assumptions.
(1) Output of supporting products are affected by the
efforts of research and development (R&D) the sup-
porting enterprise paid and external random factors;
output function is 𝜋 = 𝜇𝑒 + 𝜀, wherein 𝑒 is the effort
of supporting enterprise R&D; platform enterprise
cannot observe the effort of supporting enterprise.
𝜇 is the influencing of supporting enterprise effort
on supporting product and 𝜀 is the influencing of
external random on production, 𝜀 ∼ 𝑁(0, 1). We have
𝐸(𝜋) = 𝐸(𝜇𝑒 + 𝜀) = 𝜇𝑒, var(𝜋) = 𝜎2.
(2) The production cost of supporting enterprise is
affected by its own effort of R&D and the influencing
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of platform enterprise on supporting enterprise; its
production cost function is a quadratic function
𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇), 𝑇 is the quantity of the resource, such as the
human and material resources invested to develop
supporting product by platform enterprise, and its
investment cost is (1/2)𝜅𝑇2 (𝜅 is a constant which
is greater than 0). The production cost function of
supporting enterprise should meet the conditions
𝜕𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕𝑒 > 0, 𝜕2𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕2𝑒 > 0, which presents
that in case of the investment of platform enterprise
not changing, with the effort of supporting enterprise
investment increased, its production cost would be
increased but the speed of the addition will be faster;
it meets the condition 𝜕3𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕3𝑒 = 0 under the
quadratic function. Furthermore, the production cost
of supporting enterprise should meet the condition
𝜕𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕𝑇 < 0, which presents that in case of the
effort of supporting enterprise R&D staying constant,
with the investment of platform enterprise increased,
the cost of supporting enterprise will be reduced.
(3) The contract signed by platform enterprise and sup-
porting enterprise is included in the contents fixed
payment and distribution of benefits, assuming the
form of contract is 𝑅(𝜋) = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝜋 (𝑎 > 0, 𝑏 > 0);
𝑎 is the fixed payment the platform enterprise pays to
supporting enterprise and 𝑏 is the distribution ratio of
benefits gained by supporting enterprise.
3. Model Establishment of Supporting Product
Collaborative Development
According to the previous assumptions, if the platform enter-
prise is risk-neutral, while the supporting enterprise is risk-
averse, the utility function is with risk-averse characteristics
𝑢(𝑅) = −𝑒
𝜌𝑅; 𝜌 is the amount of risk aversion and the risk
costs of supporting enterprise are (1/2)𝜌𝑏2𝜎2. The revenue
function of platform enterprise can be expressed as
𝑉
1
= 𝜋 − 𝑅 (𝜋) −
1
2
𝜅𝑇
2
= (1 − 𝑏) 𝜇𝑒 − 𝑎 −
1
2
𝜅𝑇
2
. (1)
The revenue function of supporting enterprise can be
expressed as
𝑉
2
= 𝐸 [𝑅 (𝜋) − 𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)] −
1
2
𝜌𝑏
2
𝜎
2
= 𝑎 + 𝑏𝜇𝑒 − 𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇) −
1
2
𝜌𝑏
2
𝜎
2
.
(2)
In the decision process of investing the month into
developing the supporting product by platform enterprise,
according to rational economic man hypothesis, it should
maximize its own interests as a decision objective. Therefore,
the problem of the platform enterprise is to choose (𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑇, 𝑒)
maximizing their certainty equivalent income:
max
(𝑎,𝑏,𝑇,𝑒)
(1 − 𝑏) 𝜇𝑒 − 𝑎 −
1
2
𝜅𝑇
2
, (3)
assuming that certainty income corresponding to reservation
utility of supporting enterprise is 𝑤
0
(𝑤
0
> 0).
Supporting enterprise accepts the conditions of the con-
tract provided by enterprise companies; the conditions it
involved in the development of supporting products are that
its benefits are greater that certainty income corresponding
to the reservation utility, so the participation constraint
condition (IR) is
𝑎 + 𝑏𝜇𝑒 − 𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇) −
1
2
𝜌𝑏
2
𝜎
2
≥ 𝑤
0
. (4)
As the platform enterprise cannot observe supporting
enterprise’s effort of investment 𝑒 and natural status 𝜀, for any
given incentive contract in advance, the supporting enter-
prise always chooses the effort 𝑒 maximizing their expected
utility function; therefore, the desirable effort 𝑒 of platform
enterprise can only be achieved through inspiring utility-
maximizing behavior of supporting enterprise, which must
be met with incentive compatibility constraints condition
(IC):
𝑒 ∈ arg max [𝑎 + 𝑏𝜇𝑒 − 𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇) − 1
2
𝜌𝑏
2
𝜎
2
] . (5)
Based on the above (3)∼(5), we can transform the prob-
lem that platform enterprise maximizes its own certainty
equivalent income into a planning problem H1:
max
(𝑎,𝑏,𝑇,𝑒)
(1 − 𝑏) 𝜇𝑒 − 𝑎 −
1
2
𝜅𝑇
2
s.t. (IR) 𝑎 + 𝑏𝜇𝑒 − 𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇) − 1
2
𝜌𝑏
2
𝜎
2
≥ 𝑤
0
(IC) 𝑒 ∈ arg max [𝑎 + 𝑏𝜇𝑒 − 𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇) − 1
2
𝜌𝑏
2
𝜎] .
(6)
4. Model Solution and Analysis
In the planning problem H1, only when the platform enter-
prise pays the lowest level 𝑤
0
, the supporting enterprise will
take part in the development of supporting products, so
formula (4) is with equality; it can be rewritten as
𝑎 + 𝑏𝜇𝑒 − 𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇) −
1
2
𝜌𝑏
2
𝜎
2
= 𝑤
0
. (7)
Transforming the form of formula (4):
𝑎 = 𝑤
0
− 𝑏𝜇𝑒 + 𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇) +
1
2
𝜌𝑏
2
𝜎
2
. (8)
Substituting formula (8) into the objective function of
formula (3), eliminating 𝑎, we have
𝑉
1
= 𝜇𝑒 −
1
2
𝜌𝑏
2
𝜎
2
− 𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇) −
1
2
𝜅𝑇
2
. (9)
Solving the incentive compatibility constraints conditions
of (5) and a derivation of 𝑒, we have
𝜇𝑏 −
𝜕𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕𝑒
= 0. (10)
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According to formula (10), we can get 𝑏 = 𝜕𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜇𝜕𝑒,
and substituting formula (8) into it and eliminating 𝑏, we have
a new optimization problem H2:
max
(𝑇,𝑒)
𝜇𝑒 −
𝜌𝜎
2
2𝜇
2
[
𝜕𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕𝑒
]
2
− 𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇) −
1
2
𝜅𝑇
2
− 𝑤
0
. (11)
In formula (11), by giving the specific expression of
𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇), it is easy to obtain the optimal investment 𝑇 and the
effort 𝑒 of supporting enterprise. And then by substituting
into (10), we can obtain the revenue sharing coefficient
in the contract. However, our concern is the influence of
nature (complementary or alternative) of platform enter-
prises’ resource inputs on research and development effort
and revenue sharing coefficient of supporting business, so
we need to establish the relationship between inputs 𝑇 for
supporting product by platform enterprise and R&D effort 𝑒
paid by supporting enterprise.
In the formula (11), get a derivation for 𝑒 and set it to zero;
the optimal first-order conditions can be obtained as follows:
𝜇 −
𝜌𝜎
2
2𝜇
2
⋅
𝜕𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕𝑒
⋅
𝜕
2
𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕
2
𝑒
−
𝜕𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕𝑒
= 0. (12)
Formula (11) presents inputs 𝑇 of platform enterprise; we
can obtain the effort 𝑒 of supporting enterprise by employing
formula (12), in which we can see 𝑒 as the function of𝑇. Using
a derivation for 𝑇, we can obtain the influence of platform
enterprise inputs 𝑇 on the level of effort 𝑒 of supporting
enterprise:
{
𝜌𝜎
2
2𝜇
2
⋅ [
𝜕
2
𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕
2
𝑒
]
2
+
𝜌𝜎
2
2𝜇
2
⋅
𝜕𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕𝑒
⋅
𝜕
3
𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕
3
𝑒
+
𝜕
2
𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕
2
𝑒
}
𝜕𝑒
𝜕𝑇
+ [
𝜌𝜎
2
2𝜇
2
⋅
𝜕
2
𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕
2
𝑒
⋅
𝜕
2
𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕𝑒 𝜕𝑇
+
𝜌𝜎
2
2𝜇
2
⋅
𝜕𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕𝑒
⋅
𝜕
3
𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕
2
𝑒 𝜕𝑇
+
𝜕
2
𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕𝑒 𝜕𝑇
] = 0.
(13)
As the cost function𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇) is a quadratic function, obtain
𝜕
3
𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕
3
𝑒 = 0, so using formula (13), we have
𝜕𝑒
𝜕𝑇
= − (
𝜌𝜎
2
2𝜇
2
⋅
𝜕
2
𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕
2
𝑒
⋅
𝜕
2
𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕𝑒 𝜕𝑇
+
𝜌𝜎
2
2𝜇
2
⋅
𝜕𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕𝑒
⋅
𝜕
3
𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕
2
𝑒 𝜕𝑇
+
𝜕
2
𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕𝑒 𝜕𝑇
)
× (
𝜌𝜎
2
2𝜇
2
⋅ [
𝜕
2
𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕
2
𝑒
]
2
+
𝜕
2
𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕
2
𝑒
)
−1
.
(14)
Considering the above analyses, we will analyze the influ-
ence of nature (complementary or alternative) of platform
enterprises’ resource inputs on R&D effort of supporting
business based on formula (14). In previous assumptions,
𝜕𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕𝑒 > 0, 𝜕2𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕2𝑒 > 0, so the positive and
negative of formula (14) depend on the positive and neg-
ative of 𝜕2𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕𝑒 𝜕𝑇 and 𝜕3𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕2𝑒 𝜕𝑇. In the cost
function of supporting enterprise 𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇), 𝜕𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕𝑒 is
the marginal cost of effort paid by supporting enterprise,
and 𝜕2𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕𝑒 𝜕𝑇 is the influence of platform enterprise
resource inputs on the marginal cost of effort paid by
supporting enterprise. If 𝜕2𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕𝑒 𝜕𝑇 < 0, it presents
that the marginal cost of effort paid by supporting enterprise
will reduce with the inputs of platform enterprise; that is,
the inputs of platform enterprise and supporting enterprise
are complementary; if 𝜕2𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕𝑒 𝜕𝑇 > 0, it presents that
the marginal cost of effort paid by supporting enterprise
will increase with the inputs of platform enterprise; that is,
the inputs of platform enterprise and supporting enterprise
are substitutive. 𝜕2𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕2𝑒 is the second derivative of
supporting enterprise’s R&D inputs effort, that is, the change
rate of the first derivative 𝜕𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕𝑒; the geometricmeaning
of the first derivative is the slope of the cost curve, while the
geometric meaning of the second derivative is the curvature
of the cost curve.
In the complementary situation, that is, 𝜕2𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/
𝜕𝑒 𝜕𝑇 < 0, the more inputs the platform enterprise invests
for supporting product development, the smaller the slope of
𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇) is. In order to guarantee that the slope of the cost curve
𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇) of the supporting enterprise effort under the situation
of high inputs of platform enterprise is always smaller than
the low inputs of platform enterprise, it has to make the
curvature of the cost curve𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇) under the situation of high
inputs of platformenterprise smaller than the curvature of the
cost curve 𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇) of the supporting enterprise effort under
the situation of low inputs of platform enterprise, as shown
in Figure 1. We can see that the cost curve of supporting
enterprise in the situation of platform enterprise low inputs
is obviously steeper than the situation of high inputs of
platform enterprise. That is, in the complementary situation,
the influence of platform enterprise inputs on the change
rate of marginal cost 𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇) can meet 𝜕3𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕2𝑒 𝜕𝑇 < 0
[18]. Hence, based on the previous analyses, we can know
that when the inputs of platform enterprise and supporting
enterprise are complementary, there are the conditions that
𝜕
2
𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕𝑒 𝜕𝑇 < 0 and 𝜕3𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕2𝑒 𝜕𝑇 < 0. In contrast,
in the substitutive situation, the cost curve of supporting
enterprise in the situation of platform enterprise high inputs
is obviously steeper than the situation of low inputs of
platform enterprise, as shown in Figure 2; there are the
conditions that 𝜕2𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕𝑒 𝜕𝑇 > 0 and 𝜕3𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕2𝑒 𝜕𝑇 >
0.
Considering previous assumptions and the above analy-
ses about influence of nature (complementary or alternative)
of platform enterprises resource inputs on R&D effort of
supporting enterprise, under the complementary situation,
as 𝜕2𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕𝑒 𝜕𝑇 < 0, 𝜕3𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕2𝑒 𝜕𝑇 < 0, and 𝜕𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/
𝜕𝑒 > 0, 𝜕2𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕2𝑒 > 0, we have
𝜌𝜎
2
2𝜇
2
⋅ [
𝜕
2
𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕
2
𝑒
]
2
+
𝜕
2
𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕
2
𝑒
> 0. (15)
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Figure 1: The cost curve of supporting enterprise under the com-
plementary situation.
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Figure 2: The cost curve of supporting enterprise under the
substitutive situation.
As (𝜌𝜎2/2𝜇2) ⋅ (𝜕2𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕2𝑒) ⋅ (𝜕2𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕𝑒 𝜕𝑇) < 0,
(𝜌𝜎
2
/2𝜇
2
) ⋅ (𝜕𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕𝑒) ⋅ (𝜕
3
𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕
2
𝑒 𝜕𝑇) < 0, we have
(𝜌𝜎
2
/2𝜇
2
) ⋅ (𝜕
2
𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕
2
𝑒) ⋅ (𝜕
2
𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕𝑒 𝜕𝑇) + (𝜌𝜎
2
/2𝜇
2
) ⋅
(𝜕𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕𝑒) ⋅ (𝜕
3
𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕
2
𝑒 𝜕𝑇) + (𝜕
2
𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕𝑒 𝜕𝑇) < 0.
It is easy to find that 𝜕𝑒/𝜕𝑇 > 0 in formula (14).
So we can get conclusion 1: in the new industry platform
innovation ecosystem, when the inputs of platform enterprise
and supporting enterprise are complementary, the level of
effort paid by supporting enterprise will increase if platform
enterprise increases its inputs.
Considering previous assumptions and the above analy-
ses about influence of nature (complementary or alternative)
of platform enterprises resource inputs on cost function of
supporting enterprise, under the substitutive situation, as
𝜕
2
𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕𝑒 𝜕𝑇 > 0, 𝜕3𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕2𝑒 𝜕𝑇 > 0, and 𝜕𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/
𝜕𝑒 > 0, 𝜕2𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕2𝑒 > 0, we have
𝜌𝜎
2
2𝜇
2
⋅ [
𝜕
2
𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕
2
𝑒
]
2
+
𝜕
2
𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕
2
𝑒
> 0. (16)
As (𝜌𝜎2/2𝜇2) ⋅ (𝜕2𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕2𝑒) ⋅ (𝜕2𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕𝑒 𝜕𝑇) > 0,
(𝜌𝜎
2
/2𝜇
2
) ⋅ (𝜕𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕𝑒) ⋅ (𝜕
3
𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕
2
𝑒 𝜕𝑇) > 0, we have
(𝜌𝜎
2
/2𝜇
2
) ⋅ (𝜕
2
𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕
2
𝑒) ⋅ (𝜕
2
𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕𝑒 𝜕𝑇) + (𝜌𝜎
2
/2𝜇
2
) ⋅
(𝜕𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕𝑒) ⋅ (𝜕
3
𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕
2
𝑒 𝜕𝑇) + (𝜕
2
𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕𝑒 𝜕𝑇) > 0.
It is easy to find that 𝜕𝑒/𝜕𝑇 < 0 in formula (14).
So we can get conclusion 2: in the new industry platform
innovation ecosystem, when the inputs of platform enterprise
and supporting enterprise are substitutive, the level of effort
paid by supporting enterprise will reduce if platform enter-
prise increases its inputs.
From conclusion 1 and conclusion 2, we can know
that in the new industry platform innovation ecosystem, if
the resource inputs of platform enterprise and supporting
enterprise are complementary in collaborative development
supporting products, the participant of platform enterprise
has the incentives for technology innovation inputs of sup-
porting enterprise; the possible reason is that the increase
of platform enterprise complementary inputs would increase
the possibility of the success developing the supporting prod-
uct. If the resource inputs of platform enterprise and support-
ing enterprise are substitutive in collaborative development
supporting products, the inputs of platform enterprise will
reduce the motivation of supporting enterprise increasing
technology innovation inputs; the possible reason is that
the supporting enterprise gives more hope to the platform
enterprise to increase its inputs and it has a “lazy” motivation
and thus is more willing to let the platform enterprise take
risk arising from inputs in product development.
The following is to analyze the impact of revenue sharing
coefficient 𝑏 on the inputs of platform enterprise; by the
formula (10), we can obtain 𝑏 = 𝜕𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜇𝜕𝑒. Establishing
the relationship between 𝑏 and the inputs 𝑇 of platform
enterprise, a derivation for 𝑇, we have
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑇
=
1
𝜇
[
𝜕
2
𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕
2
𝑒
⋅
𝜕𝑒
𝜕𝑇
+
𝜕
2
𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕𝑒𝜕𝑇
] . (17)
Substituting formula (14) into formula (17), we can obtain
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑇
= − (
𝜌𝜎
2
2𝜇
2
⋅
𝜕𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕𝑒
⋅
𝜕
3
𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕
2
𝑒𝜕𝑇
⋅
𝜕
2
𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕
2
𝑒
)
× (𝜇{
𝜌𝜎
2
2𝜇
2
⋅ [
𝜕
2
𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕
2
𝑒
]
2
+
𝜕
2
𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕
2
𝑒
})
−1
.
(18)
Analyzing formula (18), considering previous assump-
tions and the above analyses about influence of nature (com-
plementary or alternative) of platform enterprises resource
inputs on cost function of supporting enterprise, under the
complementary situation, as 𝜕2𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕𝑒 𝜕𝑇 < 0, 𝜕3𝐶(𝑒,
𝑇)/𝜕
2
𝑒 𝜕𝑇 < 0, and 𝜕𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕𝑒 > 0, 𝜕2𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕2𝑒 > 0, we
have
𝜇{
𝜌𝜎
2
2𝜇
2
⋅ [
𝜕
2
𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕
2
𝑒
]
2
+
𝜕
2
𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕
2
𝑒
} > 0,
𝜌𝜎
2
2𝜇
2
⋅
𝜕𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕𝑒
⋅
𝜕
3
𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕
2
𝑒 𝜕𝑇
⋅
𝜕
2
𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕
2
𝑒
< 0, so 𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑇
> 0.
(19)
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So we can get conclusion 3: in the new industry platform
innovation ecosystem, when the inputs of platform enterprise
and supporting enterprise are complementary, the revenue
sharing coefficient of supporting enterprise will increase if
platform enterprise increases its inputs.
Analyzing formula (18), considering previous assump-
tions and the above analyses about influence of nature (com-
plementary or alternative) of platform enterprises resource
inputs on cost function of supporting enterprise, under
the substitutive situation, as 𝜕2𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕𝑒 𝜕𝑇 > 0, 𝜕3𝐶(𝑒,
𝑇)/𝜕
2
𝑒 𝜕𝑇 > 0, 𝜕𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕𝑒 > 0, and 𝜕2𝐶(𝑒, 𝑇)/𝜕2𝑒 > 0, we
have
𝜇{
𝜌𝜎
2
2𝜇
2
⋅ [
𝜕
2
𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕
2
𝑒
]
2
+
𝜕
2
𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕
2
𝑒
} > 0,
𝜌𝜎
2
2𝜇
2
⋅
𝜕𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕𝑒
⋅
𝜕
3
𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕
2
𝑒 𝜕𝑇
⋅
𝜕
2
𝐶 (𝑒, 𝑇)
𝜕
2
𝑒
> 0, so 𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑇
< 0.
(20)
So we can get conclusion 4: in the new industry platform
innovation ecosystem, when the inputs of platform enterprise
and supporting enterprise are substitutive, the revenue shar-
ing coefficient of supporting enterprise will reduce if platform
enterprise increases its inputs.
From conclusion 3 and conclusion 4 we can know that
in the new industry platform innovation ecosystem, when
the resource inputs of platform enterprise and supporting
enterprise are complementary in collaborative development
supporting products, if the platform enterprise increases
its inputs for developing the supporting product, it should
increase the revenue sharing coefficient of supporting enter-
prise letting it take more risks. The possible reason is that
the inputs of platform enterprise reduce the marginal cost
of supporting enterprise for technology innovation and, in
contrast, increase its marginal revenue, so the supporting
enterprise will make its marginal cost equal to marginal
revenue, and platform enterprise would like to increase rev-
enue sharing coefficient to increase the inputs of supporting
enterprise. In contrast, when the resource inputs of plat-
form enterprise and supporting enterprise are substitutive
in collaborative development supporting products, if the
platform enterprise increases its inputs for developing the
supporting product, it should reduce the revenue sharing
coefficient of supporting enterprise letting it take fewer risks.
The possible reason is that the inputs of platform enterprise
may increase the marginal cost of supporting enterprise for
technology innovation and, in contrast, reduce its marginal
revenue. It is difficult for platform enterprise to increase the
inputs of supporting enterprise by increasing revenue sharing
coefficient.
5. Conclusion
The value of new industry platform innovation ecosystem
depends on not only the effect of platform enterprise on
platform product but also the value of supporting product,
so platform enterprise always participates in the development
of supporting product. From the previous analyses, we can
find supporting enterprise R&D effort and revenue sharing
coefficient in collaborative process depending on the nature
of platform enterprise inputs on supporting product.
(1) When the inputs of platform enterprise and sup-
porting enterprise are complementary, increasing platform
enterprise inputs will generate the positive incentives for
supporting enterprise. In contrast, when the inputs of plat-
form enterprise and supporting enterprise are substitutive,
increasing platform enterprise inputs will generate the nega-
tive incentives for supporting enterprise. The conclusions for
constructing eco-innovation platform have two inspirations:
firstly, for the platform enterprises in emerging industry
innovation ecosystem, they should choose partners with
complementary resources in building innovation ecosystem
process. For example, when IBM built innovation ecosystem,
it only focused on hardware development platform; the gen-
eral partners it chose are with middleware and application
software development capabilities which are complementary
for it.
Secondly, if in the platform innovation ecosystem the
platform enterprise and supporting enterprise have separate
resource substitution, platform enterprise should be less
involved in the development of supporting product, because
when the resources are substitutive, increasing the inputs of
platform enterprise will reduce the enthusiasm of supporting
enterprises, an increase of supporting enterprise “lazy” moti-
vation; if the platform enterprise and supporting enterprise
are the complementary resources, the former should increase
its inputs for developing supporting product; this is because
increasing inputs of platform enterprise increase the likeli-
hood of successful product development, which also has a
good incentive for supporting enterprise.
(2) When the inputs of platform enterprise and sup-
porting enterprise are complementary, the revenue sharing
coefficient of supporting enterprise will increase if platform
enterprise increases its inputs. When the inputs of platform
enterprise and supporting enterprise are substitutive, the
revenue sharing coefficient of supporting enterprise will
reduce if platform enterprise increases its inputs. Hence,
in the contract design process, platform enterprise should
take full account of the nature of development inputs for
supporting product. Under the complementary situation, the
contract should increase the proportion of variable income
of supporting enterprise, reducing fixed pay part, so that the
supporting enterprise should take more development risks;
under the substitutive situation, the contract should reduce
the proportion of variable income of supporting enterprise
and increase the portion of the fixed payment, so the support-
ing enterprise takes less development risks. This conclusion
has some theoretical reference value for the contract design
of supporting product’s collaborative development in new
industry platform innovation ecosystem.
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